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BWR Explosions 
 
On November 7, 2001, a hydrogen explosion ruptured and fragmented a 6 inch steam condensate 
pipe elbow at the Hamaoka-1 boiling water reactor (BWR) nuclear power plant in Japan, while 
the plant was in operation, Figure 1. A month later, on December 14, 2001, a hydrogen explosion 
ruptured an approximately eight foot long section of a 4 inch spray line at the Brunsbuttel BWR 
nuclear power plant in Germany, also while the plant was in operation, Figure 2. In both cases 
the cause of the explosion was believed to be the accumulation and detonation of hydrogen gases 
created by radiolysis of water or steam. The ignition source was not conclusively identified [1,2]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Six-inch Elbow Rupture at Hamaoka-1, Japan. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Four-inch Pipe Rupture at Brunsbuttel, Germany. 
 
Overview of the Assessment Process 
 
The two BWR accidents point to the need to assess the risks associated with the accumulation 
and explosion of hydrogen by radiolysis. A six-step approach for such an assessment is presented 
in the logic diagram of Figure 3. 
 
Step 1 determines which systems are susceptible to hydrogen accumulation by radiolysis, and 
their initial conditions (hydrogen-oxygen mixtures, their location and their initial pressures and 
temperatures). This step also groups the systems into classes by similarity of materials and 
designs. 
 
Step 2 determines whether the explosion is a deflagration (subsonic pressure wave), a detonation 
(supersonic pressure wave), or a deflagration that transitions into a detonation (referred to as 
deflagration-to-detonation transition or DDT). Having established the initial conditions and the 
explosion regime, this step develops the explosion pressure time histories (pressure vs. time) and 
peak temperatures. This is the fluid dynamics aspect of the assessment. 
 
Step 3 calculates the structural capacity of systems, equipment and components subject to the 
explosion loads of Step 2. Step 4 compares the demand (pressure and temperature) to the 
capacity. These are the stress-strain analysis and fracture analysis aspects of the assessment. 
 
If in Step 4 the demand exceeds the capacity, Step 5 investigates the failure mode to help 
understand the consequences of such an explosion, which is the final step, Step 6. 
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Figure 3 - Assessment Logic for Hydrogen Explosions 
 
Demand: Pressure Pulse 
 
An explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy [3]. When it is due to the combustion of 
flammable gases, an explosion takes the form of either a deflagration or a detonation. Table 1 
compares the two phenomena: 
 
Table 1 - Comparison of Deflagration and Detonation Characteristics 
Parameter Deflagration Detonation 
Propagation Velocity < 740 mph in air 
< 2,800 mph in H2 
~ 4,500 mph 
Peak Pressure (absolute) ~ 6 x Pinitial ~ 16 x Pinitial 
Pressure vs Time Figure 4 Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Deflagration Time History [4] 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Detonation Time Histories for Three Initial Gas Mixture Conditions [5] 
 
In the detonation profile of Figure 5, the narrow peak pressure is the Chapman-Jouguet (C-J) 
pressure, the remnant exponential decay following the C-J pressure is the Taylor-Zeldovich 
pressure profile. Not shown is the Von Neumann pressure, a very narrow spike concurrent with 
the C-J pressure and nearly twice as large as C-J. 
 
Further: 
 
• When the pressure wave reflects on a solid surface or at a gas-liquid interface it is 
amplified by a factor of 2 to 2.5. 
• When a deflagration transitions to a detonation, the C-J pressure is further amplified. 
 
Dynamic Response Regime 
 
For the simplest of shapes, a straight cylindrical pipe, the explosion causes an outward radial 
expansion (breathing) of the pipe wall. The magnitude of the dynamic response in the form of 
radial expansion of the component depends not only on the magnitude of the explosion pressure 
but also on its duration. Two dynamic response regimes are possible [3,6]: 
 
Quasi-Static Regime: In this case, the peak pressure lasts a sufficiently long time to fully strain 
the pipe wall, and the effect of the pressure is predicted by increasing the peak pressure by a 
dynamic load factor (DLF) of 2 maximum. The quasi-static regime takes place if 
 
comppulse T%25T ×>  
 
Tpulse = duration of the pressure pulse, sec 
Tcomp = natural period of the first response mode of the component, sec 
 
For a cylindrical steel pipe this condition can be written as 
 
000,66
DTpulse >  
 
D = pipe diameter, in 
 
For example, for a 2 inch pipe (D = 2.375”) the explosion is quasi-static if the pressure spike 
lasts more than 2.375 / 66,000 = 35 micro-seconds. The pipe will sense twice the peak pressure. 
 
Impulsive Regime: In this case, the peak pressure is of such short duration that the metal has no 
time to fully strain before the pressure has dropped. In this case the component response does not 
depend on the magnitude of the peak pressure, instead the response depends on the pressure 
impulse (the area under the pressure vs. time curve). The impulsive regime takes place if 
 
comppulse T%25T ×<  
 
Note that Baker places the quasi-static regime at Tpulse > 40 Tcomp and the impulsive regime at 
Tpulse < 0.4 Tcomp, and between these two regimes is the dynamic regime [6]. 
 
Method of Analysis 
 
Given the explosion pressure time history (pressure vs time), four decisions must be made 
regarding the structural capacity analysis: 
 
• Closed-form solution or finite elements: The closed-form solution is suitable for simple 
shapes such as cylindrical pipes, bends and flat end plates. For more complex shapes the 
analysis is conducted by finite element analysis. 
 
• Static or dynamic: If the dynamic response regime is quasi-static, then the explosion 
pressures can be applied statically, with a dynamic load factor. If the dynamic regime is 
impulsive, a dynamic analysis is more appropriate (pressure vs time applied to the 
model). 
 
• Elastic or plastic: If the stresses remain below yield, or if an ASME B31 or ASME III 
elastic stress criterion will be applied, the analysis must be elastic (linear stress-strain). If 
the evaluation will be based on strain limits or ASME III Appendix F plastic criteria, the 
analysis must be plastic. 
 
• Material properties: Under explosive loads, the strain rates are large and the strength 
properties of steel (yield stress and ultimate strength) increase. This strengthening effect 
could be included in the structural model, or conservatively ignored [7]. 
 
Evaluation Criteria: Codes and Standards 
 
The design of vessels “to accommodate loadings produced by deflagration” is addressed in 
ASME VIII Non-Mandatory Appendix H, which in turn refers to ASME III Division 1, in 
particular “Level D” plastic design [10, 11]. ASME III Division 1 Appendix F plastic analysis 
design rules limit primary membrane stresses to 70% of ultimate and maximum stresses to 90% 
of ultimate. For stainless steel, these limits correspond to strain limits in the order of 5% 
membrane and 15% peak. The actual failure strain is larger, as evidenced in Figure 6, where the 
bulging (membrane) strain is in the order of 30%. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Pipe Bulging from Hydrogen Detonation 
 
An ASME VIII Division 3 code case is currently being drafted for the design of pressure vessels 
subject to impulsive loads, based primarily on US and UK experience in the design of 
detonation-containing vessels [12, 13, 14]. The proposed strain limits are 0.2% (elastic limit) for 
membrane (average) strain and 2.5% and 5% for peak strains in welds and base metal 
respectively. 
 
For piping systems, the ASME B31 code does not explicitly address design for explosions [15]. 
However, there is a large body of studies on detonations in cylindrical tubes and pipes, 
particularly related to the development of pulse detonation engines [16 to 23]. Similar design 
rules would apply as for pressure vessels, in addition to having to address the effects of pipe 
whip as the explosive wave travels through the system. 
 
Failure Mode 
 
Explosions in pipes and vessels can have several effects: 
 
• No perceptible deformation if the stresses generated by the explosion are below yield. 
• Blowout of gaskets, packing and mechanical joints by overpressure. 
• Bulging, as illustrated in Figure 6, when the material behaves in a ductile manner and 
stresses exceed yield but are below the ultimate strength. 
• Brittle fracture, with little deformation, when the material is brittle (such as cast iron or 
plastic). 
• Fish-mouth rupture as illustrated in Figure 7. Here the stresses exceed the ultimate 
strength of the material, but there is insufficient explosive energy to drive the fracture 
beyond the split. 
• Fish-Mouth rupture, with bifurcation as illustrated in Figure 8. The bifurcated cracks may 
wrap around the pipe and separate (guillotine break) the section. 
• Long rupture along a weak seam or a flaw, such as the weld between the tank shell and 
roof in Figure 9. 
• Fracture in two or more fragments as illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Typical Ductile Fish-Mouth Rupture by Steady Over-Pressure 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - Typical Large Rupture with Bifurcation of Crack 
 
 
 
Figure 9 - Vapor Space Explosion in Tank with Weld Failure [8] 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Fragmentation by Detonation of an Acetylene Gas Cylinder [9] 
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